JORDAN'S FEAR OF THE ISIS
There
are two countries that fear more than others the spread of the
ISIS, their military conquests and their destabilizing effect:
Lebanon and Jordan. This is due in part to the presence of
extremists and terrorists on their territory. Lebanon is a country
that has always coped with institutional instability and which is,
at least in part, used to facing risky social, political and
military circumstances and to finding solutions through internal
mediation. Jordan, on the other hand, belongs to that part of the
world that thrives from its belonging to a well-defined
international context; a country that has its own, non-negotiable,
internal and foreign policy; and which has a monarchy which, after
the death of king Hussein, is in need of reaffirming its role and
prestige. This exposes Amman to the risk that derives from the
spreading Islamic extremism in the region, which the Jordanian
monarchy is trying to oppose.
Collateral effects
The Syrian civil war, the rise of the ISIS and its spread
throughout the Iraqi territories are elements which undermine the
stability, if not the survival, of the Hashemite regime. The 179
Km border with Iraq and the 379 Km border with Syria are an
ominous reminder of this. The first, tangible, side effect of this
situation on Jordanian society is the presence of over 680.000
Syrian refugees in the country. The real figure is probably
rounded down substantially, since it is based on the UN's data.
Analysts speak of over 1.5 million Syrians scattered across
Jordan, to which one must add at least 1 million Iraqis and about
600.000 Egyptians. For a country that has a total population of
roughly 7.5 millions, this incredible mass of refugees represents
not only an economic burden, but a social threat as well.
Especially since it is reasonable to assume that among these
million visitors, some may actually be involved in Islamic
terrorism.
It is therefore on the internal security level that the Jordanian
reign runs the greater risk. There are presently over 2.000
Jordanian volunteers that fight among the ranks of the ISIS and of
Jabhat al Nusra, both in Syria and in Iraq. Also, according to
polls carried out by the University of Amman, a rough 10% of the
population allegedly sympathizes with Islamic extremism.
Demonstrations that took place in June 2014 in Ma'an, in the south
of the country - a region which has been the theater of numerous
uprisings and Salafite infiltration and where many volunteers have
traveled to join Jabhat al Nusra - seem to confirm this statistic.
Another hint is the recent discovery and arrest of about 30
alleged terrorists that were preparing and/or organizing terrorist
attacks within the Jordanian realm.
Abdul Majid Thuneibat
The Jordanian Muslim Brothers
The potential support for extremism becomes even more worrisome if
it is coupled with the activism and social rooting of the Muslim
Brothers in Jordan. Politically speaking, the Brotherhood is the
opposition, and operates within the bounds of a legal context with
respect to the Islamic Action Front (IAF). In more real terms, the
group is constantly fueling disorder and trying to ride the social
resentment of the local population. Lately, the (re)banishing of
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the shunning on the part of Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf countries and the marginalization of Hamas
have created much tension within the Jordanian branch of the
Brotherhood and have widened the gap between those who wish to
operate within set rules and those who would rather adopt radical
initiatives.
The internal clash within the Muslim Brothers found its apex on
February 14, 2015, when the organization was split into two
separate groups. The council of the Shura, the uppermost governing
body of the Brotherhood, expelled 10 members of the organization
whom, in turn, demanded and obtained the legalization of a new
political party. In practice this new faction of the Muslim
Brothers, headed by Abdul Majid Thuneibat – which is sometimes
described as being a “reformist”, but who is actually just
pro-government – wants to sever the ties with their Egyptian
counterpart and with Hamas, a choice which is strongly criticized
by the hawks within the movement.
This confrontation sees the Council of the Shura, which approved
the ousting of the dissidents, against the Council of the Students
of the Muslim Brothers, which supports Thuneibat. The operation
serves to draw a net distinction between the hawks, who want to
continue supporting the claims and the uprisings of the Middle
Eastern brothers, and the doves, who want to operate legally in
the Jordanian context alone.
The internal clash within the Jordanian Brotherhood has drawn
Hamas in as well. The organization was instrumentally accused by
Abdul Majid Thunebait of creating a secret branch within Jordan.
The circumstance was, of course, denied by the leaders of Hamas,
but has nonetheless threatened the long years of negotiations
carried forth by Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas' political
office, in his attempt to rekindle relationships with King
Abdullah II; Hamas was banished from Jordan in 1999.
The risk of fragmentation
Accepting the request by Thuneibat to legalize its branch of the
Muslim Brothers is aimed mostly at making the opposite faction,
which is still numerically prevalent, illegal. The Jordanian
government is acquiescent, or at least favorable, to the break-up
which, initially, seems to weaken the Brotherhood. Yet they too
fear the consequences of forcing a part of the movement into
clandestine activity and the security issues that could derive
from such a move. The Muslim Brothers in Jordan count on an active
militia of 6 to 7 thousand men and could easily blend in with the
militias of the Sheikh of the ISIS, Al Baghdadi. This is the
reason why the Jordanian Brotherhood, despite the mounting
pressure of the Gulf countries and of Egypt, was never included in
Amman's list of terrorist organizations.
In order to launch his initiative, Abdul Majid Thuneibat
emphasized the added value of his belonging to a Bedouin tribe
which is juxtaposed to the majority of the Council of the Shura;
the latter being more supportive of Palestinian claims, with all
that this implies in the region. We shall not forget that, despite
the fact that Palestinians account roughly for half of Jordan's
population, the Hashemite monarchy bases its force and consensus
on the Bedouins. In order to see the full picture, we must add
that the Islamic Action Front (IAF) is not currently represented
in the Jordanian parliament – they boycotted the latest general
elections – and they therefore act both politically and socially
on the margins of legality.
The ties with terrorism
The relation between Islamic extremism and the internal situation
of the Muslim Brothers constitutes, on the internal level, one of
the main threats for the stability of Jordan's monarchy. The
leader of the IAF, Sheikh Hamza Mansour, has recently stated that
the Caliphate can include Jordan, albeit with the consent of the
population, and a similar view is shared by the Jordanian
Salafites, headed by Mohammed Shalabi (aka Abu Sayyaf).
Recently, in order to lessen – on the religious level – the appeal
of radical groups and to invalidate the brutality of the ISIS, the
Jordanian authorities have released two theologians who are famous
for their radical stance. The first, Abu Qatada, aka Omar Mahmoud
Othman, is a Jordanian/Palestinian who was extradited to the UK in
2013 for terrorism and who has recently and, perhaps, not
casually, been found not guilty. The second is Abu Mohammed al
Maqdisi, aka Assem Mohammed Tahir al Barqawi, also a
Jordanian/Palestinian, who was sentenced to 5 years in prison for
recruiting mujaheddin in Afghanistan and who is well known to
Jordanian prisons for having spent 16 years behind bars for his
involvement in terrorism activities. His writings were a source of
inspiration and legitimization for Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq
and for Ayman al Zawahiri in Afghanistan. The release of both
extremists was part of a trade off where the two agreed to openly
accuse the ISIS once outside.
Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi
Choosing a side
Apart from the endogenous threats, there are those coming from
outside as well. Jordan is firmly opposed to the ISIS; this is due
in part to the international context in which the country operates
– of which the USA, Western countries and, in part, Israel, are
the guarantors – and in part by the social and political beliefs
of Jordan's monarchy. The country's military effort was evident
when one of its fighter planes was downed over Raqqa on December
24, 2014. The pilot of the Jordanian airplane was captured and
burned alive on January 3, 2015. The circumstance strengthened the
Jordanian anti-ISIS stance in terms of their military involvement
– see the “Martyr Muath” aerial retaliation and the deployment of
armored vehicles along the borders with Syria and Iraq. The recent
conquest of the passage between Jordan and Syria by Jabath al
Nusra has further increased the threat of instability.
In the past few years, Jordan became first the center of the
struggle against Bashar al Assad's regime, then the heart of the
struggle against the ISIS. Amman harbors about 8.000 US soldiers
on its territory, especially 'elite' groups, an aerial unit in
Mafraq, where the CIA trains Syrian rebels (the US administration
has recently allocated half a billion dollars for the training of
at least 5.000 rebels in the coming year), and an Operative
Military Command in Amman where Americans, Saudis and members of
other Gulf countries coordinate operations in the region. Jordan
allows rebels to cross its border and to travel back to Syria with
weapons and money, therefore supporting their military activity.
The importance of Amman in the fight against the ISIS and against
the Syrian regime was emphasized by the recent visit, on March 5,
2015, of the leader of Al Quds, the special units of the
Revolutionary Guards: Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. The visit
landed on the eve of operations to recapture Tikrit on the part of
the Iraqi army with Teheran's support. Soleimani met with the
director of the GID (General Intelligence Directorate), General
Faisal al Shoubaki; it is not clear whether the General met King
Abdullah as well. The subject of the meeting was the presence of
about 15.000 Shiite militiamen in Syria, a part of which are
Iranian. The General was welcome with great enthusiasm, even in
terms of protocol, which implies that, in the event of a
rekindling of relationships between Iran and the Gulf countries,
Jordan could play a central role – provided the Saudis agree to
it. Amman has (re)started diplomatic exchanges with Teheran last
September, with the designation of a new ambassador to Iran and,
after Soleimani's visit, with the visit in Teheran of the
Jordanian foreign minister Nassir Judeh.
The US Chief of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, travels often to
Amman to speak with local authorities. The US have recently
approved substantial military aid in favor of the Jordanian reign
for the year 2016.
An imminent danger
Yet, as we mentioned, despite the military campaign and the
international support, the Jordanian realm is not safe from
imminent danger. Although some terrorist cells that were allegedly
planning attacks in the country have been arrested, Jordan borders
war zones, with the possibility of further terrorist infiltration,
and there is a florid market for smuggled weapons.
The Hashemite dynasty has always had a bumpy relationship with the
Saudi monarchy due to the competition between the two for
legitimization in the control of the holy sites, where each of the
parties claims to be a descendant of the Prophet. Nowadays,
instead, due in part to the common enemy, ISIS, Amman and Riyadh
have gotten closer. This nearness produces for Jordan, a country
without resources and that lives off international donations, new
financing which is rather useful in relieving poverty and social
upheaval in a country with an unemployment rate between 25 and 30
percent.
Unlike his father Hussein, king Abdullah still has to consolidate
his role of monarch in the eyes of the local population. The death
of the pilot Muath al Kassabeh and the king's participation in the
funeral function have bettered the image of the king and
especially that of his wife Rania, of Palestinian origin, who is
often criticized for the lavishness which she flaunts. The choice
of siding against the ISIS is not a popular one among Jordanians,
who would have preferred a more neutral approach in the nearby
crisis zones. The Muslim Brothers are not the only ones to feel
this way.
But a choice had to be made because, apart from the threat of the
ISIS, the Syrian civil war, the exponential spread of political
and terrorist Islamic radicalism, the Hashemite reign is also
involved in another dispute: that of Palestine. The confirmation
of Benjamin Netanyahu, who claims that he will never allow the
formation of a Palestinian state, in the recent Israeli elections
is creating the basis for a new Intifada. In Jordan, where roughly
half of the population is of Palestinian origin, such circumstance
could be very dangerous for the stability of the reign.
Then there is the problem of the Houthi and of the Saudi military
attack in Yemen. Jordan supports the initiative publicly, but they
fear that this new crisis could draw attention from the country's
absolute priority: the fight against the ISIS. From the start of
the Saudi Yemenite campaign, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain
have removed their aerial military support from the international
coalition that fights the ISIS to use it in Yemen.
Presently, Jordanian foreign policy tends to distinguish itself
from that of many other regional actors: they are against the
isolation of Iran; in the Syrian war, they'd rather see the fall
of the ISIS than that of Assad's regime; they are prudently
critical of US disengagement in the region; they have welcome
General Haftar from Libya, offering him arms and training. Only
time will tell if the choices of king Abdullah have been wise
ones. Yet one must never forget that, in the Middle Eastern
context, Jordan is one of the weakest players, both in
demographically, financially and militarily.
