A PAN-ARAB FORCE TO DEFEAT THE ISIS?
Despite
US air strikes, Iraqi military offensives or the use of “improper”
weapons by the Syrian regime, the ISIS's militias have continued
to win battles and benefit from a growing popular support that has
led flocks of foreign volunteers to join Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in
his conquests. As things currently stand, the ISIS is still a role
model that has gained in credibility and attracted proselytes.
This means that their threat has become significant and to be
accounted for.
Regardless of the atrocities committed by the ISIS, although some
may “appreciate” a conflict fought without any rules or
limitations, the media hype surrounding the terrorist group seems
to have pushed Al Qaeda's current head, Ayman al Zawahiri, to seek
an agreement and a synergy with al Baghdadi. In the eyes of the
Islamic radicals, the failure of the US air strikes to produce any
tangible results is itself a success, a sign of destiny, a victory
of faith against impiousness, a feeling of invulnerability.
Frustration is instead the dominant feeling on the opposite front
of those who would want to terminate the threat posed by the ISIS.
But a war on terror will never be won with aerial bombardments,
especially in the case of the ISIS and because of its widespread
popular base, but only through a ground warfare. To date, apart
from the countries directly involved such as Iraq and Syria, not
one Arab country, the sole entitled to this task, has felt the
need to deploy its forces on the ground to fight the ISIS's
militias.
Abdel Fattah Al Sisi
A Sunni coalition
Forced by the deterioration of the situation in Yemen, the issue
of the creation of a Pan-Arab force to fight terrorism in the
region has been brought forward by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have
recently tried to form a coalition of Sunni Arab countries to halt
the Houthis. The man behind the proposal is Egyptian President
Abdel Fattah Al Sisi for a number of reasons: he is facing the
threat from the ISIS both at home (Ansar Beit al Maqdis in the
Sinai has declared its allegiance to al Baghdadi) and next door
(ISIS militias station in Derna and Sirte in Libya), he badly
needs Saudi financing and to regain a key role in Middle Eastern
affairs after the July 2013 coup and the repression against the
Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition that followed.
The issue of forming a Pan-Arab force was raised during the Arab
League's meeting in Sharm el Sheikh on March 29, 2015 when events
in Yemen were discussed. In that occasion, it was proposed that a
high level committee be formed to study how to form a rapid
intervention force of 40 thousand elite soldiers and how to share
aerial and naval forces. It's not as clear instead how each of the
22 nations of the League will contribute to the force.
The discussions have moved forward from that first meeting in
Sharm el Sheikh and embraced a wider array of objectives: the
rapid intervention force could also be deployed domestically to
quell internal instability, in this case the word “terrorism”
includes any form of opposition and dissent, like the one that
gave birth to the Arab Spring. The other target is the growing
Iranian influence in the region that is pushing the Sunnis to join
forces. The latter objective has become more and more important
following the agreement on Iran's nuclear programme, that could
lead to a lifting of the sanctions against Tehran and that could
grant the Ayatollah's regime the resources and the international
credibility to play a hegemonic role in the region.
A very long road
The creation of a Pan-Arab force has been discussed by the Arab
League for some time already, but never saw the light. Working
groups were created to draft a proposal, but to no avail. There
have been temporary military alliances during the 1967 and 1973
wars against Israel, while a coalition of Arab countries fought
alongside the Americans during the Gulf War against Saddam
Hussein. But that's as far as it goes.
The plan is now to revive a 1950 Joint Arab Defense Treaty that
was signed by the members of the Arab League following the
disastrous 1948 conflict against the Israelis. Article 2 states
that an aggression against a signatory country is to be considered
an act of war against all parties member to the treaty. The
problem with this treaty is its outdated functioning: a meeting of
Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministers, the definition of
the objectives, the role of each nation and so on.
But the road to a Pan-Arab military force is still very long. It
is pretty evident already that the bulk of the forces will be
provided by Egypt, due to its dominating demographics in the Arab
world, while the funding would be left to Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf countries. The main difficulties derive from having to build
everything from scratch: a Headquarter (given the main actors it
could either be in Cairo or Riyadh), a unique command and control
system, an organization tasked with training the forces to fight,
various operational and logistical bases.
Basically, since it is a very ambitious project, there are many
hurdles to clear. There will be practical and psychological
difficulties to overcome, since mutual distrust has been
accumulated over the decades. Problems will also arise on the
decision on what the priorities should be: Egypt wants to
eliminate the ISIS in Libya, Saudi Arabia is concerned with the
Iranian and Shia menace in Yemen, while Jordan, together with
Syria and Iraq, is worried about the ISIS spilling over from its
neighbors. And even once the priorities have been set, the issue
will revolve around when and how to intervene, given the different
approaches different countries have in the Arab world.
Opposition to this plan could also come from within the Arab
League. Member countries like Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and
Somalia could oppose the idea of a Pan-Arab force intervening on
their territory. In case an agreement cannot not be brokered by
the Arab League, seeking an alternative could mean separate and
more limited military agreements could be signed bilaterally by
member countries.
GCC member states
The example of the GCC
The closest we now have to a Pan-Arab force has been created in
December 2013 by the Gulf Cooperation Council. For the first time,
a unified military command controls 100 thousand men, half of
which are Saudis. During a previous attempt in 1982, the force
named “Peninsula Shield” was blocked by the Gulf's smaller
countries that feared Saudi interference in their domestic
affairs. The combined threat of the ISIS and Iran has pushed all
objections aside.
Overall, the military coordination of six countries, like in the
GCC, with similar weapons originating from the United States will
not provide as many headaches as the idea of having to manage
arsenals from 22 countries from the Arab League whose weapons come
from both the Eastern and Western blocks. This would become a
logistical nightmare.
The proposal by the Arab League, although still in its embryonic
stage, has already met the favor of the United States. Washington
is happy to support an Arab contingent that will fight the ISIS in
its stead. That's why the CIA's chief, John Brennan, took a flight
to Cairo on April 19, 2015 and showed up a few days before an Arab
League's meeting on the issue. It was a tangible and visible sign
of support at all levels. Other sources claim that during that
visit Egypt also received the green light to strike the ISIS in
Libya. It is in fact not a coincidence that US President Barack
Obama has decided to lift the sanctions on weapons sales to Cairo
just weeks ago.
A necessary dialogue
What the Egyptian and Saudi initiative cannot attain is an
anti-ISIS cooperation with Iran. Tehran is helping out the
regime's Pasdarans in Syria, it has provided volunteers to fight
alongside Iraqi troops to retake Tikrit (and could do the same in
the near future with Mosul), and is assisting the Hezbollah. If we
had to single out a country that is currently fighting Al
Baghdadi's militias, that would be Iran.
Clearly, no agreement between the Arab League and Tehran is now
possible. Even though the Middle East is a volatile environment,
there are too many diverging opinions on how to solve the
different crisis in the region. Furthermore, the Sunni vs Shia
divide cannot be overcome so easily. All of these elements
combined mean the military elimination of the ISIS will be more
difficult to achieve, unless the United States and Iran appease
themselves. But this scenario will see the light only in the long
term.
The formation of the Pan-Arab rapid intervention force would be an
important step towards the definitive crushing of the different
forms of regional terrorism. Muslim boots on the ground would
deprive the ISIS of one of its main arguments and sources of
consensus, like the fight against the “crusaders”, the “apostates”
and the “impious”. The fact that these troops would have a similar
mindset and the same culture as that of their opponents would also
mean that no pity will be granted to those defeated. But, after
all, there aren't that many followers of the Geneva Convention in
this part of the world.