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THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS

Revenues, rapes, violence, banditism, mass arrests, killings covered by impunity, punitive raids, looting and pillaging even in neighboring Cameroon. All of these are part of the current conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR), where even the tragedy of child soldiers has re-emerged. There are no exact figures on the number of victims of this sort of civil war between a central government and rebel groups. Those displaced - at least those officially registered by humanitarian organizations - amount to 500 thousand people in a country of 5 million inhabitants. 60 thousand are the refugees that have fled in neighboring countries. A boundless humanitarian disaster that, as often happens for Africa, has not struck a chord with international public opinion.

The crisis began in March 2013 when the Seleka rebellion (Seleka in the local Bantu dialect, the Sango, means "alliance") took over the country and ousted by force the dictator at the time, president François Bozize'. The military campaign that led the rebels into the capital Bangui had begun on December 10 2012. Coming from the north of the country, the rebels installed Michel Djotodia as an interim president or rather, as he puts it, "transitional head of state". The Constitution was suspended and the Seleka militias were to be dissolved, but this did not occur.

There is always a good reason for a coup d'etat in the Central African Republic, a country with a long history of dictators who have taken turns at the helm of CAR ever since independence from France in 1960: David Dacko, replaced by his famous cousin - known for his ruthlessness and crimes, and for his unlimited narcissism - the self-proclaimed emperor Jean Bede'l Bokassa, followed by Dacko once more, then by Ange-Felix Patasse' (supported by Khadafi) and finally replaced by François Bozize' in 2003.

The motive leading the Seleka rebels to take over power was not the thirst for social justice or democracy. The putsch was the nth upheaval caused by the natural replacement of one dictator with the next one. This time around though - and this is the worrying bit - there was a religious twist to the saga, something lacking before. Interim president Djotodia is a muslim from the north of CAR.

The Seleka militias comprised people from Darfur, Chadians and Sudanese, most of whom had been living as refugees in CAR for decades. A sort of international brigade whose fighters did not even speak the national language of the Central African Republic: Sango. The only thing they had in common was their religion: the majority of the combatants were muslim in a country where they represent a minority (around 15% of the population against 50/60% of christians).

In a country that had never faced any religious conflict, the Selekas have been responsible of igniting sectarian violence. They were around 3-4 thousand when they began their advance in the north and over 25 thousand rebels entered Bangui only a few months later. Was this a show of support from the people of CAR? Not necessarily because revolutions in Africa often enable the winners to reap the benefits in terms of pillages and rapes.

The "international" nature of these militias and their deployment in the north of the country fuel the hypothesis they could have been supported by the president of Chad, Idriss Deby. A longtime dictator himself, Deby has always played a key role in CAR's internal affairs since his rise to power in 1990. It is probably not a coincidence that the rebellion led by the Selekas burst following the deterioration of the relationship between Deby and Bozize', whose rise to the presidency had been sponsored by his Chadian counterpart.

At the end of 2012, François Bozize's presidential guard, composed of Chadian praetorians, was withdrawn and some CAR opposition members held in N'Djamena's jails were released. Then, suddenly, a rebel group popped out of nowhere with plenty of weapons and resources that enabled it to conquer the whole of the Central African Republic within a few months.

French interventionism

The history of CAR isn't any different from the chronicles of abuses, dictatorships, human rights violations, interference and neocolonialism that are abundant in Africa. This is yet another African story ignored by international public opinion and neglected to the point that no one is involved in avoiding the risk of a religious-based genocide.

And if the international community is missing, the former French colonial power fills the void. The UN's shy attempts and the intervention of an African contingent - as usual scarcely incisive - have provided Paris the opportunity to send its own troops on the ground. The Security Council's Resolution 2121 approved in October 2013 has given the green light to the French intervention aimed not at re-installing democracy - which did not exist, nor ever existed before - but rather at re-affirming Paris' paternal role when it comes to its former colonies (take Mali for instance). In the background are economic and strategic interests that have led France first to side with the Seleka rebellion to oust president Bozize' (it is always convenient to climb on the bandwagon), and then to switch sides in the aftermath of the ethnic and religious cleansing forcing interim president Michel Djotodia to step down and go into exile on January 10 2014.

Operation "Sangaris", as the French intervention in Bangui has been labelled, is also the result of the constant military activism animating French foreign policy when it comes to Africa. Over the last couple of years, Paris has sent troops in Mali (operation "Serval" in February 2013), Ivory Coast (since over a decade) and has been at the forefront of the military intervention to topple Muammar Khadafi in Libya. CAR is plentiful of raw materials (gold, uranium, diamonds), rich public contracts to be awarded to friendly countries and host to a strategic permanent French military presence.

The policy of the interests has had to take into account the abuses perpetrated on the ground, both those committed by Bozize' and by the Seleka, and the risk of having to employ - whether rightfully or not - the "G" word so feared by Bill Clinton during the Rwanda slaughter: genocide. Churches and mosques have been targeted in CAR. On December 5 2013, for instance, 105 people were killed during a reprisal attack on Bangui's central mosque amid growing tensions between christians and muslims.

On one side are the so-called "self-defense groups", made up of christians and also known as "anti-balaka" (literally anti-machete), a reference to the weapons used by the Seleka. If now the French are disarming the Selaka militias, the risk is that the new balance of power could lead to a hunting down of muslims. It would also be interesting to find out how these "anti-balaka" groups suddenly received weapons and military training. This is yet another hint that there are greater interests at stake and concealed players at work over the Central African Republic.

The evolution of Islam

The history of CAR is associated with the name of a christian priest, Barthelemy Boganda, that managed to peacefully rally the people of his country together and obtain independence in 1960. He was not CAR's first president because he died in a plane crash whose causes have never been thoroughly investigated. Islam, on the other hand, has never played any political role in the Central African Republic, nor has it ever been a source of conflict. Muslim minorities originate from the migration of islamic tribes coming from neighboring areas.

In CAR's complex ethnic structure, Bantu tribes - 80 of them across the country - are largely dominant: the Baya in the south-west (32% of then population), the Mandja (21%) in the center-west, the Banda (27%) in the center-east after having fled muslim persecution in Darfur, the Azande in the east coming from Congo and Sudan, the Sara (10%) originating from Chad and the Sango living along the banks of the Ubangui river. The majority of these people are either christian and/or animist. Only the Fulbe and Bororo (or Mbarara) minorities in the north and north-west of the country are muslims and have imported Islam in CAR together with the Hausa populations living in most of West Africa.

Islam in the Central African Republic has never had a great following also because it was traditionally associated with slave trade, flourishing in the hands of the Arabs. And not even Libya's influence during the Patasse' presidency was able to overturn this religious trend. Nonetheless, even though a minority, the Central African muslims - and especially the pastoralist and nomadic Bororo tribes - are considered to be wealthy. This has fueled, over the years, a resentment among the other fellow tribes and has seldom been the source of tensions.

Over the last few years, some provinces in the north of CAR have witnessed attacks against christian clergy. But these were isolated incidents. But now the Bororo have filled the ranks of the Seleka and have taken along their grudge against president François

Bozize', whom they deem responsible for the growing instability that has affected their regions of origin.

The ethnic factor and the dangers of a genocide

Besides from religion, there is also an ethnic element at stake. The fight between Ange-Felix Patasse' and François Bozize' has never been on religious grounds - both are christians - but on tribal ones. The first one is a Baya, while Bozize' belongs to the Yakoma minority. The Yakomas have traditionally had a strong presence in the Armed Forces and have been persecuted following Bozize's dismissal from Chief of Staffs in 2001. Mass graves were found by journalists of a catholic radio station, "Radio Notre Dame", leading to the arrest of its editor, a priest.

Michel Djotodia was instead a Gula, a muslim people from the north of CAR. The risk the Central African Republic now faces is that the resignation of the interim president could not be enough to bring the christian and muslim communities back on track. The fact that people started fighting in the streets across the country is symptomatic of a degenerating scenario. At a wider glance, the fight between muslims and christians is very similar to the war waged by Boko Haram (aka Jamaat Ahi al Sunna li Da' wat al Jihad) in neighboring Nigeria. And this is not a good sign.

OMAN AND THE SECRET OF DIVERSITY

In the Arabic peninsula, Oman is a case apart. It is not involved in the feud between Shiites and Sunnis, it doesn't have relevant internal social problems and has a good relationships with all of its neighbors, no matter how turbulent these may be. It is not a hazard that part of the secret negotiations between the USA and Iran regarding the nuclear issue have been held in Oman, with the active participation of sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said.

People seldom speak of Oman, it is a country that is almost never in the news and, when it is, it is usually not because of the same reasons as the rest of the Middle East. Countries bicker all around Muscat, as it remains silent, strengthened by its neutral foreign policy which allows it to interact with Iran, for one.

Oman, in theory, is a small country (309.000 square km) with a limited population (a little more than 3 million inhabitants). It produces and exports oil since 1967 (in lesser quantities than its neighbors) but has the great advantage of a strategically important geographical position: it controls the strait of Hormuz (especially the deeper side, where oil tankers transit). Although only 54 km wide, the strait of Hormuz is crossed by 15 million barrels of oil every day. In other words, about 25% of world's oil.

This gives Oman a greater relational weight than its demographic or economic size would suggest. In fact, it allows this small sultanate to move independently as far as foreign policy is concerned and to turn its strategic importance into decisional and relational weight.

The real question is: what allows Oman to be stable, alien to all regional bickering, on good terms with its neighbors, able to live and survive outside of all of the social and political conflicts that scar the Arab peninsula.

The diversity

The first reason is religious. Omanites, at least the majority of them (over 75% of the population) are Ibadites, a minority Islamic current that lies somewhere between Sunnism and Shiitism. It is a moderate version of Islam with a strong ethic social sense and is free of the extremist approaches that surface from the other theological schools. This circumstance is reflected in Oman's foreign policy, which is personified in the religious role and absolute temporal power of the sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said.

The second reason is in the role of the sultan Qaboos. Qaboos rose to power on July 23rd 1970 after ousting his father (later exiled in the UK) with a non-violent coup d'etat (with UK support). After becoming sultan, Qaboos immediately gave his reign a modern social and economic footprint. With the strength of its oil fields, Oman managed to do away with its conservative isolationism while keeping the same structure of absolute power which, despite the look and feel of a moderate libertarianism, is so far unaltered.

The peculiar profile of Oman has made it so that the so-called Arab Spring, which has brought about social upheavals in many countries of the Arab peninsula, in the Middle East and North Africa, has left the small Gulf state substantially unaltered. After limited protests in 2011, the sultan promised – and enacted – economic reforms and has introduced

economic benefits for those without a job and further political rights. The social upheaval was averted with but a partial use of repression.

One of the principal characteristics of Qaboos is the pragmatism with which he administers the country. The sultan studied in Indian schools then, at the age of 16, was transferred to British ones. He went to the military academy of Sandhurst, where he served in the British army. He has traveled the world, is a man of a profound culture, a lover of classical music (he created a symphonic orchestra which he personally administers), he writes music, plays the organ and the lute. Sultan Qaboos is not, like many of his neighbors, a rich and illiterate beduin who cannot keep up with progress. His qualities are recognized even by the other leaders of the Arab world.

Another characteristic of Oman is its culture, history and the traditions of its people. The majority of Omanites are not of beduin or nomad extraction (as most of their neighbors are). They are seafaring people. They have colonized the African coasts (Zanzibar was under their control). They profited from trade in the Indian Ocean (unlike the United Arab Emirates, where pirates prevailed) and have always been open to the outside world. This has allowed the Ibadite monarchy to remain independent since 1650, once the Portuguese were chased away from the country. Its autonomy was but partially scathed in 1891 when Oman became a British protectorate, up to its independence in 1951. Relationships with the UK have remained good, as have those with the US.

Internal policy and freedom

Internally, Oman isn't much different from the neighbouring regimes. It is an absolute monarchy which, despite the ample vision of the sultan, offers little room to participated democracy or civil rights. Even in this Oman is different from nearby countries.

Despite the 1996 law which makes Islam the State religion, other religions have the right to keep and administer their shrines. There are some limitations to proselitism, one must register at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and, of course, it is prohibited to create any turmoil or disturb the public order.

Speaking of women's rights, it is sufficient to say that women represent about 30% of manual labor in Oman. They serve as ministers, have the right to vote and are represented in the State Council. The comparison with nearby Saudi Arabia, where they are still debating whether or not to allow women to drive a car and where only today a partial voting right for women has been introduced, is quite emblematic. Literacy among the population is quite high: over 90% for men and over 80% for women.

On the political level, although keeping power fast in his grip – from the power of the government's foreign and economic policy to the judicial system and the armed and security forces – Qaboos has tried, from time to time, to obtain a certain degree of popular consensus. The Shura (consultative assembly), a structure which is typical of the Ibadite culture, has been gradually modeled according to the popular instances and circumstances.

Presently the Omanite parliamentary system is based on a Council of State (Majlis al Dawla) which is designated by the Sultan and on a Majlis al Shura elected by universal suffrage for men and women over 21. Laws, which can be proposed in the above councils

– although limited to the economic and social sectors – need nonetheless the final approval of the Sultan.

Political parties are of course illegal, the right to assembly and association are limited, the press is scrupulously overseen (although private radios and TV's have been authorized to exist since 2004), the internet is meticulously controlled and the judges of the Supreme Court are designated by the Sultan. Nothing can be done without the consent of the Sultan, the regime is absolute and authoritarian but compared to the other Middle Eastern countries and thanks to the good sense of the Sultan, Oman is a “happy island” in the Persian Gulf.

The proof of this is that in Oman there is no terrorism (despite the nearness to countries where terrorism exists) and the attempts – modest at most – of opposition to the Sultan by Islamic groups date to 1994 and 2005. The last attempt at insurrection against the central authorities of Muscat dates back to the communist rebellion in the region of Dhofar, near the border with Yemen, between 1965 and 1975, a problem inherited from Qaboos' father (whom he deposed) which was solved thanks to the military support of the Shah of Persia, the King of Jordan and by the UK. Even then, once the rebellion had been drowned, Qaboos granted an amnesty to the rebels and invited them to join the armed forces.

The asset of foreign policy

The substantial difference between Oman and the other countries in the Middle East is mostly in its foreign policy. Oman resides within the US sphere of influence and protection but, unlike the other countries that dwell there, it manages to do without hurting Iran's susceptibility. On the one side there are accords, which have been renewed through time, between Muscat and Washington, in virtue of which the US armed forces use Omanite air and naval installations (Thumrait and Masirah) in which they stock armaments and provisions. On the other side, Muscat and Teheran have signed a security agreement (August 4, 2010) which includes, among other things, joint military training. A preceding agreement from 2009 also included the cooperation in the fight against contraband in the Gulf of Oman.

The characteristics of Omanite foreign policy can be summarized in three words: pragmatism, non-alignment (but good neighborhood relations) and non-interference with foreign issues, which means neutrality. There exist no ideological militancy in prepackaged formations but a lot of diplomatic transgression based on strategic evaluations. Time and again, Qaboos sides with those that he thinks are right.

In 1979, when all of the Arab countries opposed to the Camp David accords between Anwar Sadat and Israel had suspended diplomatic relationships with Egypt, Qaboos, distancing himself from the opinion of the Arab League, had not.

When the more conservative countries refused to start relationships with the Soviet Union and China, Qaboos was the first to do so. Then, when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, Oman immediately signed an agreement with the US to let them use Omanite bases (the nearby nations, which were then contrary, finally conceded their bases in 1993 and 2003, during the war against Iraq).

When all the neighbouring countries were against Israel, in December 1994 Qaboos was the first Arab leader to receive an official visit from the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The visit was reiterated by Shimon Peres in April 1996. In 1995 Oman and Israel had opened bilateral commercial offices (which were then closed due to the intifada) and there was never any boycotting on the part of Qaboos against Tel Aviv.

When the nearby countries all supported the Sunni regime in Bahrain against the Shiite rebellion of March 2011, Qaboos' Oman also gave his verbal support, like the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, but without sending his troops over.

When the international military intervention against Muammar Khadafi's Libya was taking place, Oman stayed neutral and did not offer any support, neither military nor financial, to the rebels. Once the war was over, Qaboos immediately recognized the legitimacy of the National Transition Council. This was not a change in his political line as he soon gave asylum to the wife and children of Khadafi until October 2012. There was an international arrest warrant issued by Interpol against Aisha and Hannibal Khadafi, but Qaboos refused to turn them over.

Oman stays clear of the Syrian issue as well. It neither supports the regime, nor the various rebel factions (even though in November 2011 he voted to oust Bashar al Assad from the Arab League and closed Oman's embassy in Damascus on the following year). Qaboos surely does not arm or finance anyone there.

Muscat is a veiled critic of the Shiite administration of Baghdad, Iraq, even though he participated in the liberation of Kuwait in 1990. Oman stays clear of Afghanistan (while they offer their military installations to the US), keeps a historical diffidence with Yemen, but nothing more (he avoids, for instance, supporting the Huti minority which dwells near the border with Oman and opposes the regime in Sana'a).

In the past, Oman has had slight relational problems with the United Arab Emirates because of some territorial disputes near the border between the two countries (such disputes were settled in 2008 after 10 years of negotiations) and because of political divergence. Lately, the arrests of respective spies operating in the two countries have caused some further frictions.

But, as we mentioned, the Omanite diplomatic masterpiece is in their relation with Iran. Sultan Qaboos saw eye to eye with the Shah and had no trouble getting along with the ayatollahs as well. He facilitated the contacts between Washington and Teheran, he mediated on the nuclear issue and negotiated between the sides even for the liberation of the Americans imprisoned in Teheran. Good neighborhood relations allowed Oman to administer and develop oil installations together with Iran. The risibly small number of Shiites on its national territory plays in Oman's favor.

The other pillar of Omanite foreign policy is its participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In this case too, Muscat has on the one side sponsored military and economic integration but at the same time – Oman's opposition just a few weeks back against Saudi Arabia's integration attempt - wants to keep his independence and keep clear of the sectary or interventist Middle Eastern policy of the other GCC countries.

The problem of succession

The problem with Oman does not lie in its present, but in its future. Any absolute monarchy feeds from the continuity with which it exercises its power. In Qaboos' case, there will be no continuity after him. The Sultan is now 74 years old, he is not married (he

was married briefly in 1976 with a cousin of his, but the two soon divorced). He had no children and thus no heirs.

When Qaboos dies, he should theoretically be succeeded by a male from within the royal family, which presently counts Qaboos' three sisters, his father's various brothers and their children. Theoretically, the first in line are the three male children of his defunct uncle Tariq Bin Taimur al Said. Their names are Assad, who is the personal representative of the Sultan, Shihab, who is a retired admiral, and Haytham, who is a Minister. Qaboos has willingly refused to designate his heir because, apparently, none of the candidates share his political caliber and charisma.

The Omanite constitution says (article 6) that at the death of the Sultan the royal family will unite and designate the successor within 3 days. If a decision cannot be reached, then the military defense council, the heads of the Supreme Court and the heads of the two branches of "parliament" will meet and open an envelope. In the envelope, the dead Sultan will have designated one or two candidates to replace him. This allows the Sultan to avoid a dynastic feud while he is alive, without guaranteeing the advent of one after his death.

THE RULES OF THE ARAB WORLD

In the muslim and Arab world there are a number of recurring circumstances that constantly keep repeating themselves and that have established a set of rules. The latest events lead us to analyze these factors to try to understand the failure of the social phenomenon labeled with the evocative - but misleading - name of "Arab Spring".

The first rule is that power, in this part of the world, has almost always been held by authoritarian regimes, democracy does not exist.

The prevailing authoritarian forms of government are a direct consequence of the total absence of any democratic culture. This was not imported by the colonial countries who have long ruled over these lands, nor by the successive division and creation of nation states with often no social common denominator. The end result was not accidental, but thoroughly planned. The weapon of coercion, as opposed to consensus, has facilitated the passage from colonies to self-determination and independence, thus avoiding with one big leap all the social contradictions the new status would have fatally determined. And, on a general basis, those who took over power did so with the acquiescent support of the former colonial powers.

The second rule is that the majority of these authoritarian regimes are of military or pseudo-dynastic extraction.

This is/was the case for Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. To these countries we have to add, with the necessary distinctions, also Kemal Ataturk's Turkey. For obvious reasons, the armed forces was one of the strongest institutions at independence. Therefore, they exploited their influence to take over power. The other option during the territorial division of the Middle East was to impose pseudo-monarchies, whose legitimacy bore from the former colonial powers rather than from history. Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrein, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the Arab Emirates all belong to this category. Overall, military regimes and monarchies use the hereditary system in the transmission of power.

The third rule is that in the Arab and muslim world no alternative political ideologies and their related social values have taken root.

There have been several attempts to disseminate ideologies that could have helped harmonize societies and awaken the participation of social masses. Nasser's Arab nationalism that turned into Pan-arabism was one of them. The so-called Arab socialism of the Baath parties in Iraq and Syria is another example. The truth is, such ideologies were not targeting the creation of social fabric, but were born to subdue and justify pre-existing military potentates. Communism, for instance, did not gain proselytes in this part of the world with the exception of the christian communities, maybe because they were socially more developed. A possible explanation is communism's professed atheism that hardly reconciles with Islam. The communist ideology served the purpose of emancipating the people of the region from colonialism, but did not affect their social development.

The fourth rule is that Islam, as opposed to christianity, has a deep social impact.

This is a religion that not only divulges concepts, but mainly behavioral precepts. It exercises a decisive influence over those societies where it prevails. Religion is one of those factors to be accounted for when we try to understand how these societies react to change. Furthermore, Islam easily moves from religious grounds into politics, with all the consequences - mainly negative ones - such a step involves. These include the disappointment determined by the passage from the sacred to the profane, from spiritual power to the secular one.

The fifth rule is that Islam is a religion without a leader, it's acephalous.

Islam does not have a hierarchical structure providing dogmatic guidelines and/or interpretations of the sacred books. In other words, it doesn't have a Vatican and its appointed clergy. There are obviously different schools of thought, influential figures in religious disputes, but there lacks a unique koranic school to become an imam or a clerical hierarchy (except for Shiism). This allows the exploitation of the writings of the Koran by those seeking a religious avail to their actions. It's as if christians and jews tried to attribute a strictly literal meaning to the tales in the Bible. This produces fatwas, extremism leading to jihad and fanaticism in a vicious circle comprising religion, social demands and politics.

The sixth rule is that once an authoritarian regime collapses, religious-based political claims take over power.

Regardless of the links between Islam and politics, the fall of a regime provides an advantage to those social structures that already deal with the transmission of consensus in islamic countries, namely the mosques and the religious associations. The latter, who provide assistance to the poorest strata of the population, turn this credit into political support. To this effect, the case of the Muslim Brotherhood is emblematic. Therefore, when a regime collapses and democracy takes its first steps, then islamic parties prevail. This is also because, as we've mentioned, there lack alternative political ideologies and Islam is the only glue keeping politics and society together.

The seventh rule is that in this part of the world there is an emphasized social inequality deriving from an unequal distribution of wealth.

This is the typical consequence of dictatorships. Whereby social justice and freedom are denied, the first effect is the creation of a class of privileged ones and one of dispossessed. And when the latter outnumber the first, then this social mass becomes capable of ousting a regime. It doesn't do it for freedom or democracy, but to respond to its daily basic needs. The mass obviously expects that the collapse of a regime will reap all those benefits it requests. But if these are not delivered, then more protests are to be expected. This is what happened in Egypt, where both the economic crisis and the failures of Mohamed Morsi's tenure have justified or tried to justify, at least in the very short term, the military's return to power. But in the Egyptian case the army also controls a good portion of the economy.

The eighth rule is that the first immediate consequence of a regime falling is anarchy and social chaos.

Authoritarian regimes generally have the quality of controlling the people they rule over. They don't grant freedom, they don't protect human rights, they abuse repression, but they definitely provide security. When such regimes fall, social chaos takes over favored by the lack of democratic sentiment inspiring the revolt of the masses. Freedom turns into anarchy leaving room once again for the abuses of the stronger over the weaker, even though this time around the roles are reversed. There is no space for tolerance or dialogue, but only for contraposition. Basically, the exercise of power lends its behaviors from the past, force instead of ideas are used once again to impose a new socio-institutional order.

The ninth rule is that Arab authoritarian regimes never create an alternative political class to compete with their power.

When a ruler is removed, there is no one that can take over from him. This is surely dictated by the logic of survival for any authoritarian regime, but this happens most where an alternative culture or virtuous examples, at least on a regional level, are lacking. The case of Iraq and Libya are emblematic.