THE NEVER-ENDING WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE HEZBOLLAH

Both
parties know it. It’s only a matter of time. Sooner or later, war
will break out again. Israel is strengthening its defensive lines
along the border with Lebanon, while the Hezbollah continue to
pile up weapons, intensify trainings and prepare for the next
confrontation. Ever since Israel left Lebanon in 2000 after 22
years of occupation and following the disastrous invasion of 2006,
there has been an ongoing direct or indirect military struggle
with the Shia militant group. A direct clash has been postponed
due to the Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria alongside Bashar al
Assad. The Israelis have only struck military convoys carrying
sophisticated Iranian supplies of weapons from Syria to Lebanon,
or when the Shia militias got too close to the Golan heights. One
of the latest incidents was on April 26, after an Iranian cargo
ship unloaded a shipment of missiles for the Lebanese group.
The presence of the Russians has somewhat limited the extent of
Israeli air strikes. Despite there being a red line between the
two parties, the potential for a casus belli that could heighten
tensions with Moscow acts as a deterrent. The Israelis have no
intention of being drawn into a conflict with Russia, despite the
Iranians being closer to home. Everyone knows that for Bashar al
Assad to survive, he needs a direct link between
Iran-Syria-Lebanon, with the Hezbollah acting as a buffer. At the
same time, the Party of God needs the Iranians to survive, receive
funding and supplies. On top of that, Hassan Nasrallah is in good
terms with Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
However, the Hezbollah’s participation in Syria has had serious
consequences on the group’s popularity, both in Lebanon and in the
Middle East. By being drawn into a sectarian conflict alongside a
government that has often meddled in Lebanese internal affairs,
the Party of God has lot the luster it had gained after its
conflict against Israel. Although they have preserved the support
of around 1.6 million Lebanese Shias, the Sunni autocracies in the
region, represented by both the Arab League and the Gulf
Cooperation Council, have labeled the group as a “terrorist
organization”. Furthermore, the military venture in Syria has had
a price in terms of victims (over 1.400), wounded (around 5.000),
and increasing difficulties in recruiting new militiamen and in
sustaining the financial burden of supporting the families of the
“martyrs”.

The Hezbollah
Currently, the Hezbollah can count on around 45 thousand fighters,
25 thousand of which are in active service, in possession of an
arsenal of over 120 thousand rockets. They are not a militia
anymore, but an army that branches out into a mechanized brigade,
a light infantry brigade and various commando units, including the
Radwan Unit (named after the late Imad Mughniyeh’s nom de guerre;
he was killed by the Israelis in Damascus in 2008). The Hezbollah
have also developed SIGINT (Signal Intelligence); cyber and
electronic warfare; they now use sophisticated night vision tools;
drones (around 200 of them, employed in Syria both for observation
and attacks); anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile; on top of that
they have built a network of bunkers and tunnels in Southern
Lebanon. The Party of God has trained an army that is specialized
in guerrilla warfare and that is well equipped and disciplined.
They have done so thanks to Iranian funding and supplies. What is
far worse (for Israel), is that the Syrian civil war has given the
over 7 thousand Hezbollah on the ground the military experience
alongside the Iranian and Russian regular armies that could prove
useful in the future. Similarly, in Yemen with the military
advisors that are supporting the Houthi rebellion.
In other words, the Hezbollah have learnt how to operate a
traditional army, a unit part of a larger deployment of forces.
They have refined their cooperation techniques on the battlefield
thanks to their participation in the inter-forces command in
Damascus where Russians and Iranians sit and coordinate, among
others, air strikes. The Hezbollah have also piled up knowledge on
logistics of complex units and mastered military action on new
morphological environments other than the Lebanese scenario. So
better planning and execution of military operations. They have
also perfected their command and control system and the logistical
support during combat. Furthermore, they have learnt how to use
new weapons, have seen them in action and know how to handle them.
They have also grasped how to use intelligence to identify targets
and which weapons should be used depending on your operational
needs. The Hezbollah have now been part of conventional warfare
and, in the future, will know how to handle a traditional army
during battle, but also identify its weak and strong points. They
have also improved their anti-aircraft and anti-tank defense in
Lebanon.
By having a continuous turnover of its cadres on the ground, all
this knowledge has become widespread. And we’re talking about both
full-time militants and reservists (the so-called “taabiah”). Most
of them come from the Shia youth movements, while other units,
such as the "Saraya al Muqawama al Lubnanyah" (The Lebanese
Resistance Brigades), include non-Shia members. They were
initially created in 1997 to face Israel; dissolved in 2000 when
the Israelis left southern Lebanon, they have now been reinstated.
The turnover system for the reservists includes a two-weeks
mandatory tour in a conflict zone. Known as “murabata”, it used to
be carried out along the border with Israel. Now instead it takes
place in Syria. Every new recruit that is taken to the frontline
undergoes 2-3 months of training. In the past, trainees were sent
to Iran to learn the art of war. That is not necessary anymore.
And with every battle, the Hezbollah become more experienced and
stronger.
The recent clashes between Hamas and Israel in Gaza were useful to
test the new Israeli anti-rocket system, the Iron Dome. The
Hezbollah have understood that they will need to saturate the
enemy’s defense system with a continuous launch of rockets and
mortars. This is why missiles are so important to them and why the
Iranians have apparently established a rocket factory in Lebanon.
Tehran is supplying their Lebanese counterpart with the most
sophisticated and precise models. And this is one of the reasons
why, on February 16, 2017, the Hezbollah’s Secretary General,
Hassan Nasrallah, listed among the Israeli targets: the Dimona
nuclear power plant, weapons and ammonium factories. Tel Aviv’s
anti-rocket system should intercept an estimated 80% of the
rockets, missiles, drones or airplanes launched on its territory.

Isreali minister for Defense, Amir Peretz
The latest round of the conflict between the Hezbollah and Israel
was fought in 2006 and was considered a “defeat” for Tel Aviv. The
then Israeli minister for Defense, Amir Peretz, had to resign
because his country had failed to prevail in a 5-weeks-long
conflict. The Hezbollah had not won, but had not been defeated. A
decade later, the Lebanese militia is not just a terrorist or
paramilitary group, but has become an army. They are not the
Lebanese army, but an army within Lebanon under the guidance of a
political party, not the government in Beirut. They are also an
army that is fighting in Syria alongside other armies. The
Hezbollah know they are the only force the Israelis fear, and this
gives them some form of psychological advantage. They are also an
army part of a wider strategic game between Iran and Israel.
The point is that there is no way to prevent the third Lebanese
war because all parties involved have to obtain a military target,
not a political one. Israel needs to re-assert its regional
supremacy. The Hezbollah have to stress that they are a force to
be dealt with because they are supported by Iran. And the only way
to attain these goals is through war. The Russian deployment is
preventing an immediate escalation. But a spark, or a reaction to
some form of provocation, would be enough to ignite the fire. It
is only a matter of time.