JORDAN, A COUNTRY ON THE FRONT LINE
In
the beginning of March, for the very first time, Jordan was faced
with the aggression of a terrorist cell belonging to the ISIS on
its own territory. The cell did not come from Syria, they were
assembled in Jordan and comprised of Jordanian nationals, with at
least one of the terrorists fresh from the Syrian mess. The
terrorists, roughly twenty in number, well armed and ready for
martyrdom, unleashed a battle that lasted many hours. In the end,
seven of them were killed and another thirteen were captured. The
battleground was the city of Irbid, a town located less than 15 km
away from the Syrian border which, in the past five years, has
seen its population double thanks to the arrival of Syrian
refugees.
Further attacks were carried out in June: one against a structure
belonging to the Security services inside a Palestinian camp in
the north of the country and another against a checkpoint near the
Syrian border. The latter attack originated inside a refugee camp
in Syria. The recurrence of such events is not surprising. Jordan
is in the front line in the war against the ISIS and participates
actively in the bombing of Syria. There is an operative center in
Amman that coordinates the international forces against the
Islamic State and US special forces are also present in the
country.
What does surprise is the fact that, despite the security measures
adopted, the reputation of the Jordanian Security Services and a
sealed border, there could still be such a grand scale attack,
which postulates the existence of an indigenous terrorist
organization that has ramifications of broad dimensions. The last
such attack took place in November 2005, when a group of suicide
bombers attacked three hotels causing roughly 60 dead. Back then
the group responsible for the bombings was headed by Abu Musab al
Zarqawi, a Jordanian national and the precursor of Abu Bakr al
Baghdadi in Iraq; the franchising was branded Al Qaeda.
It is not yet clear whether Irbid’s ISIS terrorist cell operated
on a specific directive of the Caliphate or if they acted
independently under the ideological influence of the Caliph.
Notwithstanding, it is a fact that the attack was carried out
during a time of weakness of the ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Every
time they feel weak, the Caliph’s forces exorcise their defeats on
the ground with further attacks and threats directed abroad. By so
doing they reaffirm the principle that the ISIS ideology has an
international value and a messianic goal.
The appeal of the Caliph
That the Caliph’s deeds appeal to the Jordanian youth is confirmed
by the fact that two sons of Jordanian parliamentarians joined the
ranks of the ISIS and died as suicide bombers. Irbid is considered
to be a stronghold of the Islamic State, while other areas of the
country, such as Zarqa – the second largest city in Jordan- and
Mafraq – where an important air force base is located – are more
closely tied to al Qaeda. Altogether, Islamic extremism is most
attractive for the part of the population of Palestinian origin,
which amounts to roughly half of the Jordanian people.
In addition to this, there is the threat represented by roughly
630.000 Syrian refugees residing in Jordan, and – according to the
Amman authorities - another 1.3 million that are not registered.
This massive presence accounts for 20% of the Jordanian
population, among whom there could be flocks of ISIS sympathizers.
Also, there is an esteemed 1.500-2.000 Jordanians that support the
ISIS, making Jordan the third greatest producer of foreign
fighters after Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. The Irbid incident could
unveil the attempt by the ISIS to destabilize the Hashemite reign
while confirming the existence of dormant terrorist cells
belonging to al Baghdadi’s organization.
The ISIS has a lot of sympathizers within the many Palestinian
refugee camps, even among the youth, who feel the social
discontent of a country with an unemployment rate that amounts to
28%. Apart from the foreign fighters, there are an esteemed
2-3.000 Jordanians that are potentially affiliated to the ISIS and
another 1.000-1.300 who belong to Jabhat al Nusra, a branch of al
Qaeda in Syria, this is especially true of the Salafite
populations.
Abu Mohammed al Tahawi
The ideological clash
Security Services in Joran are trying to fight the spread of
Islamic extremism, especially on a cultural and theological
ground. Nonetheless, the recent release of two theologians like
Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi and Abu Qatada, who preach extremism and
who have distanced themselves from the initiatives of the ISIS on
religious grounds, has not yet produced satisfactory results.
Their followers have shrunk in number and other subjects have
replaced the two in the fancy of the Jordanian people.
Among these subjects, confined inside a prison cell in Syria, is
another important figure, Abu Mohammed al Tahawi, who was
repeatedly incarcerated and released last year. Tahawi has a
discrete following among the people of Palestinian origin and
among Jordanian Salafites. Unlike al Maqdisi, al Tahawi has
officially backed the theological dissertations calling for the
fighters to wage battle under the flag of the ISIS in Syria. In
the past, Tahawi had officially praised the idea of a Jihad
against Israel. During his speeches, Tahawi often praised suicide
bombers while he underlined the impiousness of a number of Arab
regimes and the duty of each and every Muslim to fight alongside
their Syrian brothers in the war against the West.
Abu Mohammed al Tahawi, whose real name is Abdul Qadir Shahada,
belongs to one of the Salafite movements that operate on a
political line different from that of the Muslim Brothers. This
part of the Jordanian population totals roughly 7 – 10.000
sympathizers of both the ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra, after a deep
identity crisis caused by the clashes between two Syrian factions
and by the execution by the ISIS of a number of Jordanian
combatants. Just like the other Muslim extremist currents,
Tahawi’s men have turbulent relationships with government
authorities.
Among Tahawi’s adepts there is one Omar Mahdi Zeidan, a religious
man born in Irbid who has become an important member of the ISIS.
One of his brothers, Mahmoud, died in Waziristan, Pakistan, in
2010 after joining al Qaeda. Another sadly well-known individual
is Mohammed al Shalabi, who also goes by the name of Abu Sayyaf;
he was born in Ma’an, an economically staggering city in the south
of Jordan that is well known for its staunch opposition against
the government. In June 2014, in Ma’an, there was a demonstration
where a number of individuals paraded while waving ISIS flags. Al
Shalabi is, however, known to be a sympathizer of Jabhat al Nusra.
The Muslim Brothers and their party, the Islamic Action Front,
exerted a strong influence in the Jordanian political and social
grounds where they operated – at least until today – within a
legal context. Their religious extremism fueled the growth of
Salafite movements which refuse any and all kinds of political
homogenization and political party structure. The Brotherhood
doesn’t hold elections but rather co-opts their adepts in the
Council of the Shura, the top part of their hierarchy, according
to a theological meritocracy. Recently the central offices of the
confraternity in Amman and a branch office in Jerash were closed
with the pretext that, in the light of the new 2014 law on
political parties, their license has not been renewed. This
initiative by the Jordanian government is coupled with the
recognition last year of a dissident branch of the movement and
with an attempt to divide the ‘legal’ Islamic front.
A country in the front line
Among the Arab countries in the region, Jordan is the most exposed
to the fight against the ISIS since one of its pilots, Muath al
Kasasbeh, was captured and burned alive in January of 2015. The
Syrian rebels who fight the regime in Damascus are trained in
Jordan and are given logistic support and weapons once they are
back in Syria. The training camps are administered by US troops
and functionaries of the CIA. However, the transfer of weapons to
the Syrian rebels has created a covert and lucrative commerce in
which some of the Security apparatus personnel is involved.
On the intelligence front, the activity of the Jordanian
information services (General Intelligence Department) on Syrian
ground is extremely developed. Currently the Salafite militants of
al Nusra and of the ISIS are allegedly 80 km away from the
Jordanian border, but most of them would be hiding in the refugee
camps scattered on the Syrian side of the border with Jordan, as
the recent terrorist attack seems to suggest. To face this
incumbent threat, Amman has recently regained the control of the
passage of Al Waleed, near the border with Syria, by fighting the
Salafite militias with two special forces battalions, one
comprised of southern Syrian tribes trained in Jordan and the
other comprised of Jordanian troops.
Currently Jordan is envisaging the possibility for their special
forces to carry out covert operations against the ISIS in Syrian
territory. The circumstance was already the subject of a warning
by the Damascus regime, which rejected the possibility, tagging
the initiative as inopportune, unsolicited and potentially
damaging for the sovereignty of the country. This initiative has
tarnished the relationship between Amman and the Saudi authorities
whom, although “officially” at war against the ISIS, see the
Jordanian interference as an indirect support to the regime of
Bashar al Assad. Unlike the Saudis, the Jordanians are well aware
of who is more dangerous between Assad and al Baghdadi, this
despite the five billion dollars that they received from Saudi
Arabia since the beginning of the civil war in Syria.
King Abdallah of Jordan
From father to son
Just like Hussein’s father, king Abdallah too was trained
militarily at the British Sandhurst academy. His father was an
airplane pilot and he is an enthusiast of the special forces; this
explains – at least in part – the attitude to use such forces,
even in distant theaters. The Jordanian special forces are
allegedly active in Libya alongside the British SAS (Special Air
Service).
Regarding the Syrian theater, the Jordanians are convinced that
the war against the ISIS is not a conventional or traditional
fight, but rather a counter-insurrectionist one; that’s why they
use their special forces against them.
Politically speaking, Jordan has always been pro-Western, a
circumstance that won the Hashemite reign the support and
protection of the United States, from whom they receive funds of
roughly one billion dollars each year. Lately, the US
disengagement in the region has hindered the role of Jordan which
has turned around to reinforce their ties with the UK and which
has kept contacts and non-publicized relations with Israel.
During recent visits to Washington DC, including talks with the
members of the US Congress in January 2016, king Abdallah
expressed veiled critiques, perplexities and frustration against
his US partners. Abdallah knows that the solution to the Syrian
civil war is presently in the hands of the Russians and that this
circumstance could damage Jordanian interests, seen that they are
on good terms with the Syrian opposition. Militarily speaking,
Jordan is worried that they will be one of the routes through
which the defeated ISIS militants will retreat once the Syrian
loyalist troops and the Kurds of the YPG have succeeded in sealing
the border with Turkey.
On the internal level, instead, Abdallah amended the constitution
and took back some of the prerogatives that he had conceded during
the Arab spring in order to avoid civil unrest. He is again a king
with more power, especially in terms of military designations and
in the field of security, in order to protect the Hashemite
monarchy one more time.