THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE KURDISH ISSUE

There
is an elephant in the room in the Middle East that will resurface
once the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are over: the Kurdish issue.
It is ever present in Turkey, where the Kurdish uprising is
ongoing; it will be in Syria, where Kurdish militias are playing a
key role in the fight against ISIS; and it has been dominant in
Iraq over the past decade, where Iraqi Kurdistan is a de facto
State within the State.
The origins of the problem
The Kurds are an ethnic group with its own culture, traditions and
language. They are mainly Sunnis, although there are Shia
minorities in Iran and Azerbaijan. They originate from the Middle
East. There are about 30/35 million Kurds worldwide mainly
scattered across Turkey (15/16 million, around 15-18% of the
population), Iraq (5/6 million), Iran (6/7 million) and Syria
(2/2.5 million, accounting for roughly 10% of the population). The
exact demographic figures are unknown as several countries don’t
want to keep a precise count to prevent unrests. The issue is that
they are a people without a country. Except for Iraq, they don’t
benefit of any form of autonomous rule.
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I,
the Sykes Picot secret agreement (1916), followed by the Sèvres
Treaty in 1920 divided the Middle East along British and French
spheres of influence. This initially meant the Kurds could have
foreseen a country of their own. But three years later, the Treaty
of Lausanne gave in to the pressure from Turkish nationalists that
were against the project and had begun transferring non-Kurdish
people in Kurdish territories. Ever since, the Kurds have been
discriminated and persecuted in the new-born countries, fueling
both resentment and demands.
They were persecuted by the Assad regime in Syria where they had
no voting rights; by Saddam Hussein who pushed for a genocidal
agenda; they are under strict control and marginalized in Iran;
they have been persecuted by the Turkish government for decades,
Kurdish areas are a de-facto war-zone and anyone allegedly
supportive of the Kurds is prosecuted or arrested in the name of
the “fight against terrorism”, be they MPs, journalists or
activists.
The Kurds in Turkey
Over the years and until the present day, the repression
orchestrated by the Turkish government against the Kurds has
pushed this minority to embrace an armed struggle that has turned
into terrorism against the authorities in Ankara, mainly targeting
the military and security forces.
The main group is the Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren
Kurdistan, PKK), a paramilitary formation created in the ‘70s
that, at least until 1999, was of marxist-leninist inspiration.
Until 1984 the PKK fought a political battle, had representatives
elected in Parliament and then decided to pick up arms. Over the
last 30 years the PKK’s armed struggle in Turkey has had highs and
lows, causing an estimated 40 thousand deaths.
The PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was arrested in Nairobi in 1999
and was then extradited to Turkey, where he has since been held in
solitary confinement on the Imrali island. Ocalan played a role in
the secret talks with the government in Ankara that went on from
2008 until 2013, when the PKK announced a truce. The move could
have envisaged greater autonomy for Turkish Kurds.
However, the talks and the truce were unilaterally violated by
president Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July 2015. The bombing of the
PKK bases in northern Iraq were dictated by domestic policy needs:
Erdogan’s AKP had failed securing a majority in the June 2015
elections, which had seen the pro-Kurdish HDP enter Parliament for
the first time. Stirring up the Kurdish conflict once more with
the nationalism that followed allowed the AKP to reach a majority
in the November 2015 early elections. Who cares if a political
victory was scored at the expense of a portion of the Turkish
population and has since pushed the country towards a democratic
involution that led to the failed coup in July 2016?
Ankara labels as “terrorist” any form of opposition, whether
democratic or not, to the regime. The lifting of the immunity for
the MPs had allowed the judiciary – strictly under government
control after the failed putsch – to indict and arrest several
members of the HDP. The same happens for those members of civil
society that denounce the growing authoritarianism of the
government, or the permanent state of emergency that afflicts
Kurdish-majority areas in Turkey and grants the government in
Ankara the power to remove local municipalities on grounds of
“terrorist support”. However, there is no evidence of ties between
the HDP and the PKK, if not their common fight for Kurdish rights.
The return to hostilities has led the PKK to carry out a series of
deadly attacks on Turkish soil against government or military
targets. The group’s base is in Iraq: in Qandil, where the HQ is
located, and in the Yazidi areas of Sinjar. Qandil also hosts
Iranian-Kurdish militias from the PJAK and is often the target of
Turkish and/or Iranian air strikes. The PKK’s presence in Iraq is
the result of the 2013 deal and of Masoud Barzani’s availability
to host his Turkish counterparts. Instead, the base in Sinjar came
about after Kurdish support to the Yazidis when they were under
attack from the ISIS. Joint Kurdish-Yazidi militias now patrol the
area. Following Turkish threats, US pressure and facing growing
Iraqi hostility, one of the PKK’s leaders, Murat Karayilan, has
recently said his group is willing to withdraw from Sinjar.
The fresh wave of violence in Turkey has also fueled the growth of
an extremist Kurdish faction: the TAK (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons).
The group had refused to participate in the talks with the Turks
back in 2004. They have now claimed responsibility for some of the
biggest and more gruesome terrorist attacks outside of
Kurdish-controlled regions.

The Kurds in Syria
The civil war in Syria has allowed Kurdish Syrians to liberate
themselves from the persecutions of the regime and obtain an
autonomous territory. Their umbrella group is the YPG (Popular
Protection Units), which is the armed branch of the PYD
(Democratic Union Party). Founded in 2003, until 2011 the PYD
fought an underground struggle. When the war broke out, they
emerged as one of the key groups in the fight against the ISIS and
kept at large from fighting Bashar al Assad. By doing so, the
Kurds have now control over a stretch of land in northern Syria
and at the border with Turkey which has been renamed Rojava, the
west, also thanks to US military support. The Kurdish fighters, an
estimated 20 thousand men, lead the Syrian Democratic Forces,
currently fighting their way to the caliphate’s “capital” in
Raqqa. Also fighting with them are the female units made up of
Kurdish Syrian women, the IPJ (Female Protection Forces).
Turkey considers the PYD, a leftist, Kurdish and armed group, a
terrorist group much like the PKK. Ankara’s rhetoric pushes for
the blacklisting of the YPG, a thesis which was not, at least
until now, supported by Washington that still considers the Syrian
Kurds a key ally.
The Kurds in Iraq
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Kurds have obtained a
de-facto independent administration of their region. They have
their own military – the 90 thousand Peshmerga have not been
integrated in the Iraqi army, and just like the Syrian Kurds,
thanks to US military support they have shown to be the most
efficient forces in the fight against the ISIS. While there is
growing unrest in Iraq, Kurdistan is an oasis of peace.
Iraqi Kurds are politically split between the KDP (Kurdistan
Democratic Party) led by Masoud Barzani, that rules over
Kurdistan, and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) run by Jalal
Talabani, former Iraqi president from 2005 till 2014. The
competition between the two parties has seen an infighting that
sparked an all-out conflict between 1994 and 1998. In political
terms, Barzani is a good friend of Turkey, while Talabani is
closer to Iran. The close relationship with Ankara – that
postulates the hostility against the PKK and, as a consequence,
the PYD – is dictated by close bilateral ties, rich trade deals
and oil sales.
In the future, Kurdistan’s autonomy can only be extended to other
territories currently not under Kurdish control. The one missing
policy target is the takeover of Kirkuk and its vast oil reserves.
Facing the opposition from the Shia-led government in Baghdad, the
Kurds claim the city that once was predominantly Kurd and that
Saddam Hussein flooded with Arabs. The Kurds presently represent
less than 20% of the population of Kirkuk, while around 600
thousand barrels per day exported to Turkey are good enough
reasons to try to control the city.
Iraqi Kurdistan is facing economic problems and a huge public
debt, around 22 billion dollars, owed mostly to Turkey. In the
middle of December 2016, PM Nechervean Barzani hosted a conference
on the independence of Kurdistan in Dahuk and invited Kurdish
delegations from neighboring countries. During that meeting he
openly talked about secession, but linked any move to previous
talks with Ankara and Baghdad. The Kurdish PM also extended an
olive branch to both the Turks and the PKK, offering to mediate
between the two.

The Kurds in Iran
Iranian Kurds also have a long history of struggle aimed at
obtaining independence or autonomy. The PJAK (Kurdistan Free Life
Party), a marxist organization, has fought against the regime in
Tehran until 2004. Active on the border with Iraq, it is
blacklisted by the United States for its affiliation to the PKK.
Its armed branch is known as the YRK (Eastern Kurdistan Defense
Units). As has happened elsewhere, the Iranian regime has crushed
every insurgency, but not with the same brutality as in
neighboring countries. Tehran is against any form of Kurdish
autonomy.
The future
Now more than ever, the Kurdish communities across the Middle East
have a greater chance of their demands being heard, if not solved.
If independence is not an option, greater autonomy and rights are.
Any further delays could fuel more unrest in the region. The
biggest obstacle to Kurdish requests is Turkey’s opposition to any
development towards greater Kurdish rights both at home and in
neighboring countries. Ankara remains the strongest military power
in the region and will have a say in the future assets of the
Middle East.
The divisions among the Kurds is another issue. The pro-Turkish
stance of Iraqi Kurds is in opposition to the hostility displayed
by the Syrian and Turkish Kurds. The fact that Iraqi Kurdistan is
a semi-independent entity goes against the legitimate interests of
other Kurdish minorities in other countries. This also implies
that there will never be a one-size-fits-all solution to Kurdish
demands. One has to wait for the end of the conflicts in Iraq,
Syria and against the ISIS to foresee the future. What is very
likely is that, once again, external players will decide the fate
of the Kurds.