YEMEN: A PROXY WAR

As
was easily predictable (Invisible Dog anticipated these events
back in October), Yemen has become the nth piece of the puzzle of
the instability in the Middle East. A number of factors have
favored the outburst of a civil war. The State has dissolved
together with the government and the Houthis have taken over
portions of the country and of the capital Sana'a, amid growing
tribal struggles and the presence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP). On March 26, 2015 the start of Saudi aerial
raids and the military operation launched by Arab and regional
States has added a new dimension to the Yemeni conflict, pushing
its boundaries to both a regional and international level. As
often happens, the tensions and frustrations running through the
Middle East are now concentrated on a socially backward and
archaic country like Yemen.
The main actors
A first hint on who the actors of this conflict are can be
extrapolated from the countries participating in the coalition
fighting the Houthis in the so-called Operation “Decisive Storm”,
Asifat al Hazm:
- Saudi Arabia is running the show, they are the country whose
interests are at stake and that is largely affected by the
insecurity along its southern borders;
- the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were taken for
granted, but it is important to notice how Oman has pulled of the
coalition. Although bordering with Yemen, it did not take part in
the military operations. There are two main reasons for this:
Sultan Qaboos has always abided to a policy of non-interference,
secondly the boundary zones are riddled with terrorists and any
decay in the security of bordering areas would simply leave more
space for Al Qaeda's militias;
- Jordan and Morocco, although not from the gulf, have asked to
join the Cooperation Council and often benefit from the financial
generosity of the countries in the Arabian Peninsula;
- Egypt, following the restoration of the military regime led by
Abdel Fattah al Sisi, can now count on a privileged relationship
with Riyadh. Al Sisi is desperate for international credibility
and is leading a country of 80 million people. Cairo hopes the
military adventure in Yemen will allow it to play a guiding role
in Arab affairs. Egypt also needs to grant the security of the
naval traffic floating through the Suez Canal. It thus needs that
the Bab el-Mandeb strait fall not in hostile hands. Whoever is in
control of Yemen controls the access to both the Red Sea, the Suez
Canal and oil routes.
- Pakistan, fearing the Shia expansionism of the Hazara in
Afghanistan, and Sudan, who's participation is solely symbolic and
in the name of pan-Sunni solidarity and of Saudi financing, are
also part of this war.
As it is pretty clear, each of these actors has its own agenda;
the internal struggle in Yemen is simply a pretext.

The Saudi motives
Saudi Arabia is the driving force behind the intervention in the
Yemeni civil war. Apart from the threat to its security, the
Saudis fight against growing Iranian influence in the region. The
struggle between Shia and Sunnis is simply the smoke screen of a
conflict between two of the biggest countries in the area.
The fact that Yemen is 40% Shia and 60% Sunni should have
suggested that a negotiated solution was far more desirable than a
war. But the al Saud reign fears that the deal on Iran's nuclear
program will pave the way, after decades of isolation, to Tehran's
return on the international scene. The warning signals for Saudi
Arabia of a growing Iranian influence are all around them: the
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the support for the Alawite regime in
Damascus, the role played in Iraqi political and military affairs
and, finally, the support to the Zaidis in Yemen.
The Saudi interventionism and the huge deployment of both men and
units (150 thousand troops, airplanes and warships) is also driven
factors within the monarchy. This is the first official act by the
new king Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who rose to the throne in
January, and a strong signal of the new strategic role the kingdom
wishes to play in regional affairs. His predecessor, king
Abdullah, was far more prudent and was more incline to mediation
than to action. In 2011 in Bahrein was the only time he moved his
troops, about a thousand men, to reinstate on the throne a Sunni
Emir in a majority Shia country. Salman, instead, has opted for a
more active role. It may also not be a coincidence that the new
Minister of Defense is the ruler's son, Mohammad bin Salman. This
is a chance for him to prove his worth and to gain a certain
degree of credibility in a future competition for the throne. He
is a very young and ambitious man.
The world has taken a stance
Also other actors on the international scene have taken their
stance in this proxy war against the Houthis. The United States
have immediately shown their support for Salman, providing both
logistical and intelligence assistance. France and the United
Kingdom have also given their political support. Turkey has
exploited the circumstance for yet another foreign policy
turnaround and have decided to stand by the Saudis. By doing so,
Ankara has let go of its good-neighbor policy with Iran to side
with a Sunni coalition. The fact is that they will be fighting
alongside Egypt, that has just sentenced to death the leaders of
the Muslim Brotherhood, whose deep ties with Recep Tayyip Erdogan
are both political and religious. Hamas' position is also
surprising, given their support for Saudi Arabia alongside with
Abdel Fattah al Sisi, who has recently added their organization to
the black list of terrorist groups. The Palestinian radical group
is now on opposite sides with Iran, that has always helped Hamas
through the Hezbollah in its fight against Israel.
Through the statements of their leader Hassan Nasrallah, the
Hezbollah, just like Iran, Syria and Iraq, have expressed their
hostility against the Saudi-led intervention. In the final stages
of their deal with the US, the Iranians have shown a limited
propensity to being directly involved in the Yemeni dispute. The
Saudi claims about Iranian military advisors and instructors
fighting alongside the Houthi militias have not been corroborated.
Russia and China have also spoken against the Saudi-led operation.
The Russians have a specific reason for this: they had one of
their biggest intelligence and listening posts in Aden that
controlled the traffic in the Red Sea and monitored the
communications in the regions. It must have been a mere
coincidence that one of the first targets of Saudi airstrikes was
the Russian consulate in Aden. Moscow will now not be able to
collect information in favor of Iran.

AQAP
An unpredictable ending
The military adventure in Yemen, given the disproportion between
the different forces on the ground, has a predictable outcome.
Saudi Arabia has total control of the airspace and the Houthi
militias will not be capable of facing such a deployment of men
and units. But, just like with any other war, be it civil or
proxy, the ultimate result is instability and radicalization. The
Houthis represent a poor and marginalized portion of Yemeni
society. They have little to lose and everything to gain. During
years of struggle, they have learned how to fight and how to
survive regardless of persecutions against them. They could easily
turn their war into a guerrilla warfare.
The Houthis can currently count on the support of the forces loyal
to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. The deposed ruler sees
this as a chance to regain the power he lost during the Yemeni
Arab Spring. Saleh and the Houthis have fought against each other
in the recent past – we can count at least 6 rounds of conflict –
but this is now just an insignificant detail. In 2009 Saudi
warplanes had intervened in Yemen in support of Saleh and against
the Houthis. Now, instead, the two arch-enemies walk hand in hand.
Saleh is from the north of Yemen, where the majority of the
Houthis live. The deposed president who recently fled to Saudi
Arabia, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, is instead from the south. This
north-south struggle takes us back in time when Yemen was split in
two, prior to the reunification of 1992.
Riyadh's attempt to reinstate president Hadi has nothing to do
with international rule of law, but rather with the stubborn
intent by Arab regimes of safeguarding the current status quo. The
Houthi's fight for freedom and a better life is a bad example for
countries that aim to keep their people at bay.
It is still unclear on who will profit from this war. Yet, a
potential winner can already be singled out: AQAP, also fighting
against the Houthis. The weaker the latter, the stronger the
terrorists. We're facing once again the same paradox: a war is
waged against Shia groups in the name of security, while a Sunni
terrorist galaxy is given a leeway despite being just as menacing,
if not more, for the Saudi reign and for the wider region.
Although AQAP is split in two between those supporting the ISIS
and those still loyal to Ayaman al Zawahiri's Al Qaeda, they are
still extremely dangerous. The recent attack against the al
Mukalla penitentiary that led to the liberation of hundreds of
terrorists, including some of AQAP's leaders, proves that they are
still a threat to be accounted for.
The Saudi military intervention has also had the nefarious effect
of turning a civil war into a regional conflict between Sunnis and
Shia. Abdul Malik al Houthi, the Zaidi militias, the political
party Ansar Allah and the Houthis' struggle to overturn centuries
of marginalization have become pawns in a larger game. The Sunnis,
as has recently emerged during a summit in Sharm el Sheikh, are
trying to create a pan-Arabic military force that is there to
stay. Yemen is simply the dress rehearsal of the future to come. A
show of solidarity that finds a common ground in the money poured
by both the Saudis and the other emirates.